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Daubert and the EPA: An Evidentiary
Approach to Reviewing Agency
Determinations of Risk
Andrew Traskt
Regulation of environmental risk poses serious problems for
affected parties. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
often bases its policies on risk assessments that overestimate
dangers, rest on questionable assumptions, and suffer from
scientific inaccuracies. When affected parties challenge these
policies, judges must exhibit great deference to the agency's
determinations rather than remedying the ultimate problem.
Under the current scheme of judicial deference, agen-
cies-especially the EPA-lack the incentive to base their deci-
sions on the best scientific information available.
This Comment explores the problems the EPA faces when
making regulatory decisions in the shadow of scientific uncertain-
ty. It advocates reducing that uncertainty by applying the
Daubert standard for admissibility of expert scientific testimony
to judicial review of agency decisions.1 Part I examines the prob-
lems agencies face in regulating environmental risks. Part II
discusses the current state of judicial review of administrative
decisions, including the specific difficulties courts face in balanc-
ing deference to an agency's specialized decisions against over-
sight of those decisions' rationality. Finally, Part III argues that
applying the Daubert standard to judicial review of agency
determinations would create an important check on agency
decisionmaking, while still allowing the EPA the discretion it
requires to make effective environmental policy.
I. PROBLEMS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL RISK REGULATION
A. What is Risk Regulation?
Environmental agencies like the EPA exist to protect the
public against environmental harms. Often, however, by the time
t B.A. 1994, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Chicago.
' Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 US 579 (1993).
570 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
a harm has -occurred, the agency can only clean up the mess.
Therefore, agencies seek to regulate substances or situations that
pose a risk of harm, to prevent the harm from occurring in the
first place. Risk regulation consists of two steps: risk assessment
and risk-benefit analysis. During risk assessment, agencies deter-
mine exactly how much danger a threat poses to the environ-
ment. Once they have made the risk assessment, agencies move
to risk-benefit analysis, which measures the beneficial effects of a
regulation against the costs of imposing it.
This Comment addresses problems that pervade the first
step: risk assessment. Commentators usually divide risk assess-
ment into four stages.2 First, the EPA performs a hazard identi-
fication, which determines whether exposure to a potentially
toxic agent threatens human health.' Second, it performs a dose-
response assessment, which relates the dose of the toxin to its
adverse health effects.4 Third, it performs an exposure as-
sessment, which estimates the possible intensity, frequency, and
duration of human exposure to the toxin.5 Finally, the EPA gen-
erates a risk characterization, which estimates the incidence of
adverse health effects under various exposure conditions.'
B. Problems
1. Credibility.
Environmental risk regulation suffers from a number of
administrative difficulties.7 First, agency risk assessments face a
credibility problem because they have overregulated some risks
to the point of absurdity. Agencies frequently make determina-
tions that, while logically based on the initial assumptions, seem
2 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing
the Process, 18-28 (National Academy 1983) ("Managing the Process"). For an excellent
discussion of these stages from an evidentiary perspective, see Vern R. Walker, Evidentia-
ry Difficulties with Quantitative Risk Assessments, 14 Colum J Envir L 469, 472-74 (1989).
See also Junius C. McElveen and Chris Amantea, Legislating Risk Assessment, 63 U Cin
L Rev 1553, 1580-89 (1995) (explaining stages of risk assessment).
National Research Council, Managing the Process at 20-23 (cited in note 2).
Id at 23-27.
5 Id at 27-28.
6 Id at 28-29.
' See, generally, John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself- The Role
of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U Cin L Rev 1643 (1995); Mark
Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Risk Assessment, 19 Harv Envir L Rev 409 (1995);
Lynn R. Goldman, Environmental Risk Assessment and National Policy: Keeping the
Process Fair, Effective and Affordable, 63 U Cin L Rev 1533 (1995); Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92
Colum L Rev 562 (1992).
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so patently ridiculous to non-regulators as to invite extensive
public criticism and even judicial reversal.' For example, in Unit-
ed States v Ottati & Goss, Inc.,' the EPA based its risk assess-
ments for a Superfund hazardous waste cleanup on the assump-
tion that small children would eat contaminated dirt 245 days a
year for three years.1" Another striking example involves risk
assessments for a proposed cleanup by the Fernald Environmen-
tal Project, which used a baseline of a "naked, dirt-eating farmer"
to measure possible exposure damage from hazardous materi-
als.' These absurdities result from the overly cautious assump-
tions agencies use when calculating the possibility of a given risk
occurring.
12
8 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
11-19 (Harvard 1993) ("Breaking the Vicious Circle"); Applegate, 63 U Cin L Rev 1643
(cited in note 7).
900 F2d 429, 441 (1st Cir 1990) (Breyer). Ottati & Goss upheld the District Court's
refusal to grant the injunctive relief requested by the EPA requiring a polluter to clean up,
a Superfund waste site. Id at 432. The First Circuit could explicitly overrule the EPA's
risk assessment in this case, instead of only commenting unfavorably, because it had
already held that when an agency seeks injunctive relief, the court is not bound by the
Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Id, citing 5 USC
§ 706 (1994).
'" Id at 441. Justice Breyer has made this case infamous in his book Breaking the
Vicious Circle at 11-12 (cited in note 8). However, Breyer may have overstated the absur-
dity of the assumption. Small children playing in a field may get dirt on their hands, and.
if they fail to wash properly before eating, could actually ingest small quantities. See
Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Review of the Hon. Stephen Breyer's
Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 24 Envir L Rev 1707, 1711.
(1994). The controversy over Breyer's characterization does not diminish the agency
credibility problem, however. If a federal judge may effectively overrule an environmenta
agency because she perceives absurdity, then agencies must convince judges of the scien..
tific validity of their assessments.
" Applegate, 63 U Cin L Rev at 1653-54 (cited in note 7). The assessment, in this
case used by a citizen task force assisting the EPA, assumed resident proximity to the
contaminated soil, full body exposure, and incidental consumption of toxic dirt. Like the
dirt-eating child, a farmer who gets dirt on her hands and in her clothes may be "naked"
for the purposes of soil exposure, but the public still perceives such standards as overly
cautious. Applegate notes that the "naked, dirt-eating farmer" standard, while itself
extremely conservative, proved much less stringent than the EPA's proposed risk stan..
dard. Id at 1653.
12 Often, agencies rely on conservative assumptions as a response to the uncertainty
they face in regulating unknown risks. By itself, a cautious assumption may justify some
small additional cost from the regulation it generates. The problem results when agencies
must make more than just one assumption per risk assessment. At that point each error
on the side of caution magnifies the effect of the other errors. See, for example, Breyer,
Breaking the Vicious Circle at 42-50 (cited in note 8); John D. Graham, Improving Chemi..
cal Risk Assessment, 14 Regulation 14, 15 (No. 4, 1991); Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk
Assessment and the Interface Between Science and Law, 14 Colum J Envir L 343, 352-53
(1989). But see Adam M. Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really Too Conservative?: Revising
the Revisionists, 14 Colum J Envir L 427 (1989).
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Absurdity alone is not a dramatic problem, but it does have
several implications for agency credibility."3 Because agencies do
not exist in a political vacuum, credibility remains important to
an agency's ability to enact good policy. If the public loses confi-
dence in an agency's ability to make policy decisions rationally,
the legislative or executive branch may step in to force rationali-
ty upon it-a cure which could prove worse than the disease. 4
2. Inconsistency.
Even if an agency does not suffer from diminished credibility,
it may still face an inconsistency problem. As any analysis of reg-
ulation will demonstrate, agencies frequently value similar risks
differently. 5 However, different agencies will sometimes treat
even the exact same risks differently.' For example, when ex-
amining the cancer risks from pesticides on food, the EPA pro-
duced an estimated risk of cancer mortality ten times greater
than the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA"). 7 In a world
of limited resources, valuing equivalent (or even identical) risks
differently invites misallocation. Assuming that one agency has
determined the proper level of risk, and that both agencies must
regulate the risk to reduce it to its optimal level, the second
agency is either over- or under-regulating. If the agency under-
regulates, lives are lost that could have been saved by more regu-
lation. If it over-regulates, it attacks a threat after the marginal
benefits of the spending no longer justify the costs of additional
regulation." Like those that reach absurd results, agencies that
inconsistently assess environmental risks invite not only public
" See, for example, Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 50-51 (cited in note 8) (dis-
cussing difficulties agencies face in fighting public opinion regarding risks).
" See, for example, the failed congressional attempts to mandate risk assessment for
environmental regulations discussed in McElveen and Amantea, 63 U Cin L Rev at 1589-
96 (cited in note 2).
" See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J Econ
Literature 1912, 1926-27 table 2 (1993).
"S Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 96 Colum L Rev
1613 (1995); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
Yale J Reg 89, 108 (1988). See also Michael Gough, How Much Cancer Can the EPA
Regulate Away?, 10 Risk Analysis 1, 4 table 2 (1990) (comparing EPA and FDA treatment
of similar cancer risks).
Cough, 10 Risk Analysis at 4 table 2 (cited in note 16). The EPA method of assess-
ing cancer mortality risk estimated 3,000 cancer deaths from an incidence of 6,000 cancer
cases. The FDA estimated only 300 cancer deaths. While this represents the most dramat-
ic example of disparity from Cough's study, the EPA's estimation of total cancer risks still
exceeded the FDA's by 13-30 percent.
" See Cass Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U Chi L Rev 1533, 1543-49 (1996).
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criticism, but also legislative or executive interference.19 Finally,
unless agencies examine their regulations in a broad context, ad-
dressing one environmental risk may actually increase the dan-
ger posed by an ancillary risk. For example, reducing the risk of
radiation poisoning by closing a nuclear power plant may in-
crease the potential damage from acid rain as people burn more
fossil fuels to compensate.2"
3. Inaccuracy.
Finally, agency risk assessments may suffer from scientific
inaccuracy.2 This inaccuracy problem stems from two causes.
First, agency risk calculations often mix both scientific and policy
determinations." Allowing scientific method to influence policy
decisions aids rational decisionmaking, but allowing policy deci-
sions to influence choice of scientific method may compromise the
validity of the facts agencies employ in their determinations."'
For example, the EPA and other agencies have placed such an
emphasis on the need to appear scientifically credible that the-y
will ground decisions exclusively on scientific data that may not
"achieve the degree of reliability ordinarily required for valid
scientific conclusions," simply because it is "scientific" data.' In
addition, the process by which agencies calculate risk assess-
ments is susceptible to political lobbying, producing an ad-
versarial instead of scientific factual inquiry.' As a result, sci-
entists on either side of risk assessment proceedings may not re-
main detached and impartial, but instead may represent parties
with financial or ideological interests at stake. Separating
these interests from a factual inquiry requires a disinterested
scientist, not a politically accountable policymaker.27 In fact, as
the failure of a proposed "Science Court" in the late 1960s indi-
" Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 50 (cited in note 8).
20 Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1540 (cited in note 18).
21 See, generally, Wagner, 96 Colum L Rev 1613 (cited in note 16).
22 For example, agency determinations of "safe" levels of exposure to toxic chemicals
may reflect not only a level of risk, but also the acceptability of that risk given current
economic constraints. Milton Russell and Michael Gruber, Risk Assessment in Environ-
mental Policy-Making, 236 Science 286, 288 (1987).
2 Harold P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in Public Policy Decisionmaking, 51
Ohio St L J 375, 387 (1990).
2' Latin, 5 Yale J Reg at 90 (cited in note 16).
25 Id at 93. See also Green, 51 Ohio St L J at 387 (cited in note 23).
26 Latin, 5 Yale J Reg at 93 (cited in note 16). See also Marcia Angell, Science on
Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case 50-68 (W.W.
Norton 1996).
2' Wagner, 96 Colum L Rev at 1628 (cited in note 16).
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cates, even scientists might lack the capability to handle such a
task.'
Second, agencies frequently lack sufficient data to support
accurate risk assessments. Therefore, overstated risks may result
from the number of assumptions agencies must make to compen-
sate for this lack of data. For example, epidemiological studies,
an important tool for toxic risk assessments, often lack rich,
plentiful data.' Because of the risks of testing on humans, scien-
tists must test toxin doses on animals. ° Moreover, because the
effects of low-level doses of a potential toxin may elude sophisti-
cated measurement techniques, scientists perform tests with
high-level doses instead.81 An epidemiological study initially
based on sparse data, extrapolated from tests involving high
(rather than low) doses of toxins on animals (rather than hu-
mans) contains at least three potentially large sources of error.
Worse, as already discussed, these errors do not merely add up,
they multiply."2 The existing regime may prove the best option
in the face of massive uncertainty, but the lack of better alterna-
tives does not excuse the unquestioning manner in which we
accept its results.
II. JuDIcIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY SCIENTIFIC DETERMINATIONS
A. Deference as Default: The Post-Chevron Mindset
So who does ensure that agencies do their jobs properly?
Currently, each branch of the government assumes some respon-
sibility. The executive branch retains the power to staff adminis-
trative agencies, which might provide a few incentives. However,
those incentives occur before the agency makes any decisions,
leaving the executive branch unresponsive to new agency actions.
Congress may legislatively fine-tune agency decisions, or impose
' Sheila Janasoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America 65-66
(Harvard 1995).
2' McElveen and Amantea, 63 U Cin L Rev at 1584-86 (cited in note 2).
o Animals may respond differently to various toxins than humans, although scien-
tists continue to better account for this difference. See Kenneth R. Foster, et al, eds,
Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law 10-12 (MIT 1993); Graham, 14 Regulation
at 16 (cited in note 12). See also McElveen and Amantea, 63 U Cin L Rev at 1584-86
(cited in note 2).
3 Extrapolating from results of high dose tests to lower actual levels of exposure
opens a source of error that regulators have yet to counter. See McElveen and Amantea,
63 U Cin L Rev at 1584-86 (cited in note 2); Graham, 14 Regulation at 16 (cited in note
12).
32 See note 12 and accompanying text.
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deadlines to spur agencies into action.3 3 However, constant leg-
islative oversight defeats the purpose of delegating the task in
the first place. Finally, most affected private parties rely on the
courts. Unfortunately, judicial review faces its own limitations.
First, obtaining judicial review of an agency's risk determina-
tions poses procedural difficulties. Plaintiffs must begin by estab-
lishing standing under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA7). 4 Then, they must establish that the agency action at
issue is a "final agency action," and therefore reviewable by the
courts. 5 Traditionally, reviewabiity does not pose an insur-
mountable obstacle. However, when plaintiffs challenge an
agency's use of scientific data, they often face non-final agency
decisions.
Assuming plaintiffs can jump these procedural hurdles, they
still must face a substantive obstacle. Currently, courts follow an
extremely deferential standard of review for EPA determinations
of environmental risk. The APA dictates that a court may set
aside agency action only if it finds it "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.""6
This legislatively-mandated deference is strongest when the
agency interprets a statute. As the Supreme Court ruled in Chev-
ron, U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., if a
"statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue
[the agency must decide], the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."37 Of course, the limits of language being what they are,
most statutes are either silent or ambiguous with respect to al-
most any issue.3' Agencies therefore enjoy great discretion in
Robert Glicksman and Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty
Years of Law and Politics, 54 L & Contemp Probs 249, 253 (1991).
" 5 USC § 701 et seq (1994). Courts have often construed the APA to allow private citi-
zens to challenge EPA actions. See, for example, McDowell v Schlesinger, 404 F Supp 221.
(W D Mo 1975). However, a host of issues remains in determining standing, including
whether an agency has actually taken an action, whether the harm is an injury in fact,
and whether the parties meet the specific requirements of the general statute. For a good
introduction to standing issues under the APA, see E.P. Krauss, Unchecked Powers: Th
Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 75 Marq L Rev 797, 826-36 (1992).
' Franklin v Massachusetts, 505 US 788, 797 ("The core question is whether the
agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process3
is one that will directly affect the parties"). See also Note, Reviewability of Environmental
Impact Statements on Legislative Proposals After Franklin v Massachusetts, 80 Cornell L
Rev 413 (1995).
5 USC § 706(2XA).
3' 467 US 837, 843 (1984).
See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 262-69 (Har-
vard 1990); Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory
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interpreting the statutes they administer. Additionally, in ruling
that the agency's answer must rest on a "permissible construc-
tion," the Court stressed that a court could not substitute its own
judgment for the agency's determination. 9 Therefore, judicial
review does not allow finding the best solution possible-rather,
the court may only accept or reject the proposed scheme. Faced
with the binary choice between affirming or negating (but not
modifying) a borderline regulation, courts usually affirm agency
interpretations. In fact, one empirical study has demonstrated
that this deference to agency interpretations has grown pervasive
enough for one to consider it the default for judicial review.'
B. Judicial Deference and Questions of Fact
Unfortunately, while deference to agency interpretations of
law seems straightforward after Chevron, courts confront a large
obstacle in determining exactly when that level of deference is
appropriate. Most agency decisions are not solely legal questions,
but "mixed" questions of both law and fact, and courts face a very
real tension in choosing between exhibiting "deference" and sim-
ply "rubber-stamping" these decisions. 1 Historically courts have
seemed confused as to the degree of examination either allowed
or required under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
This confusion is greatest when the agency must decide
questions involving both legal and factual issues. Possibly be-
cause of the blurry line between science and policy, courts fre-
quently have assumed that an "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard of review requires deference to the agency's expertise in
making factual determinations as well as in its interpretation of
the law.'2 This approach finds support in dicta from the Su-
State 116-17 (Harvard 1990).
3' 467 US at 843-44 ("In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.").
o Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L J 984, 1058-59 (finding a 15% increase
in affirmances and a 40% decline in remand/reversals following the Chevron decision).
41 For a succinct statement of this dilemma in a factfinding, rather than a Chevron,
context, see Lead Industries Assn, Inc. v EPA, 647 F2d 1130, 1145 (DC Cir 1980).
42 See Reynolds Metals Co. v EPA, 760 F2d 549, 559 (4th Cir 1985) ("... an agency's
data selection and choice of statistical methods are entitled to great deference."); The Con-
necticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v EPA, 696 F2d 169, 177 (2d Cir 1982) (deferring
to "the Agency's technical expertise" on the question of whether it could model the effect
of one pollutant on other pollutants).
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preme Court's decision in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.:
[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commis-
sion is making predictions, within its area of special
expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining
this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to sim-
ple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be
at its most deferential."
Opposing this line of thought, several Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have held that, while courts must defer to final agency
determinations of risk, they also must review the facts the agen-
cy used in arriving at that decision as carefully as they would
any other agency decisions." This conflict between deference to
factual findings and probing inquiry of evidence is important to
resolve. On the one hand, if the EPA can make scientific determi-
nations knowing its reasoning will never undergo review, it faces
fewer incentives to make sound decisions." At the same time,
the EPA, like other administrative agencies, exists to render
highly technical judgments that the legislature and (non-adminis-
trative) executive are poorly qualified to make.' Given this need.
for specialization, it seems logical that courts should defer to the
EPA's expertise when it acts in its bailiwick.
4' 462 US 87, 103 (1983). See also National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticidev
v EPA, 867 F2d 636, 645 (DC Cir 1989) (finding agency settlement with pesticide manu.-
facturer reasonable in face of Administrator's assertion that scientific controversy existed
as to risk of chlordane use).
" See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v EPA, 902 F2d 962, 968 (DC Cir
1990) (stating that while the court "must defer to the agency's interpretation of equivocal
evidence so long as it is reasonable," it "must, nevertheless, carefully review the record to
ascertain that the agency has made a reasoned decision based on 'reasonable extrapola-
tions from some reliable evidence.'); National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v
Thomas, 809 F2d 875 (DC Cir 1987) (finding the EPA's reversal on proper pesticide
exposures in mangoes "arbitrary and capricious" because it lacked "adequate support" in
the record). This emphasis on a "hard look" at the facts underlying agency decisions
predates Chevron. See, for example, Lead Industries Assn, Inc. v EPA, 647 F2d 1130, 1145
(DC Cir 1980) ("[Tlhe court must undertake a 'substantial inquiry' into the facts, one that
is 'searching and careful.'); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v EPA, 578 F2d 660, 664 (6th
Cir 1978) (holding EPA determination "arbitrary & capricious" because it ignores all the
scientific evidence before the agency).
" See, for example, Patricia Smith King, Applying Daubert to the "Hard Look"
Requirement of NEPA Scientific Evidence Before the Forest Service in Sierra Club v
Marita, 2 Wis Envir L J 147, 157 (1995).
" John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information and Regulatory Structure
in Toxic Substances Control, 9 Yale J Reg 277, 289-95 (1992).
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This conflict grows even more pronounced in the context of
risk assessment. Unlike other agency decisions, risk assessment
possesses some characteristics that make judicial review especial-
ly difficult. First, risk assessment involves a conscious blending
of scientific fact and policy judgment. As a result, determining
which portions of a risk assessment courts may actually review
becomes especially daunting. Second, given the paucity of reliable
data on newer, unforeseen risks, courts face a natural temptation
to defer to agencies as much as possible when deciding which
data an agency may consider.
III. APPLYING DAUBERT TO EPA DETERMINATION
Courts may resolve the conflict between deference to final
EPA determinations of policy and scrutiny of the science upon
which the EPA based those decisions by stepping outside of the
administrative law paradigm and looking to the Supreme Court's
recent evidentiary decision, Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. .' Applying the admissibility test for scien-
tific expert testimony under Daubert may help to preserve the
advantages of both deference to policy and scrutiny of science.
In order to understand fully why applying the Daubert stan-
dard helps to resolve the conflict between necessary deference to
agency expertise and judicial checks on unfettered agency discre-
tion, it is first important to examine the background of the
Daubert case itself.
A. Daubert
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., involved a
challenge to the longstanding "general acceptance" test for scien-
tific evidence articulated by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Frye v United States." James Alphonso Frye, a murder defen-
dant, attempted to introduce evidence of his innocence via the
results of a "systolic blood pressure deception test," essentially a
crude precursor to the polygraph.49 The prosecution challenged
the admissibility of both the test results and the testimony of the
administering scientist.0 The court ruled that while "U]ust
when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
4 509 US 579 (1993).
293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923).
" Id.
" Id at 1014.
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the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine . . . ,"" the principle or discovery "must be sufficiently es-.
tablished to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."52 This "general acceptance" test be-
came the norm for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence until 1993." The general acceptance test offered dis-.
tinct advantages. It was easy to administer, did not require judg-.
es to moonlight as scientists, and worked reasonably well at
screening out "junk science." 4 The test suffered from a distinct
disadvantage as well. Depending on the judge wielding the test,
it either precluded valid but innovative scientific theories because
they had not yet reached the level of "general acceptance," or it
proved utterly useless as judges allowed evidence on the premise
that someone had to be the first to espouse an innovative, though
not yet proven, theory." In the context of this debate over scien-
tific rigor, the Daubert case appeared.
The litigation in Daubert concerned infants suffering from
limb reduction birth defects allegedly resulting from their
mothers' use of Benedictin, an antinausea drug marketed by
Merrell Dow.5" After extensive pretrial discovery, Merrell Dow
moved for summary judgment because no evidence existed dem-
onstrating Benedictin to be a human teratogen.5 7 In support of
its motion, Merrell Dow attached an affidavit by an expert on
toxicology stating that a careful review of the scientific literature
, Id.
52 293 F at 1014.
'3 See, for example, Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Methods of Attacking Scientific
Evidence §4-5 (Michie 2d ed 1992).
' At least, most of the time. For a stinging late Frye-era critique of how judges be-
came unable to distinguish between genuine innovators and quacks, see Peter W. Huber,
Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 14-17 (Basic 1991).
See, for example, Judge Stern's concurring opinion in Rubanick v Witco Chemical
Corp., 576 A2d 4 (NJ 1990):
There always has to be a first; someone must be an innovator. Yet, I suppose
that Christopher Columbus could never have been qualified as an expert to
render an opinion on circumnavigation, and the Wright brothers would never
have been able to testify as experts and give opinions relating to flight because,
for much of their day, their views never gained "general acceptance within the
scientific community.'
Id at 15 (citations omitted).
" 509 US at 582. For an examination of the scientific disputes underlying Benedictin
litigation, see Louis Lasagna and Sheila R. Shulman, Benedictin and the Language of
Causation, in Kenneth R. Foster, et al, eds, Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the
Law 101 (MIT 1993).
" 509 US at 582. A teratogen is a substance capable of causing malformations in a
human fetus, leading to birth defects.
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on Benedictin failed to show any teratogenic effects." The plain-
tiffs countered Merrell Dow's expert testimony that Benedictin
was safe with expert testimony of their own. Using animal stud-
ies, pharmacological studies, and "reanalysis of previously pub-
lished epidemiological studies," they argued Benedictin was tera-
togenic.59 Despite the conflicting testimony, the District Court
granted summary judgment for Merrell Dow, finding the
plaintiffs' expert testimony inadmissible because the methods
employed were not sufficiently established to receive general
acceptance."° The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on
appeal, explicitly citing the Frye general acceptance test as the
basis for its decision."1
The Supreme Court held that the enactment of the "more
liberal" Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") in 1975, especially
Rule 702 concerning expert testimony, superseded the Frye "gen-
eral acceptance test."62 As a result, the Court remanded the case
for further consideration using FRE 702 instead of the Frye gen-
eral acceptance test.6
8 Id.
'9 Id. at 583.
o Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F Supp 570, 572 (S D Cal 1989).
In rejecting the evidence, the District Court stated, "There are two schools of thought gov-
erning expert testimony in these Benedictin cases, and one seems to be prevailing in the
Federal Courts. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the prevailing school of thought warrants
summary judgment [against them] in this case." Id. Interestingly, the rationale the
District Court used did not mention Frye explicitly, but rather claimed that Federal Rule
of Evidence 703 restricted the admissibility of scientific evidence to that which has "gen-
eral acceptance." Id. Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible into evidence.
FRE 703. Apparently, the District Court misread FRE 703's hearsay exception (allowing
hearsay if "of a type reasonably relied on by experts . . . ") as requiring the general ac-
ceptance test for all evidence. In addition, the District Court stated that it must "critically
evaluate" the experts' reasoning process, but then claimed that "absent a scientific under-
standing" of Benedictin's effects, the plaintiffs would have to establish causation via epi-
demiological evidence, the "generally accepted" method in Benedictin litigation. Daubert,
727 F Supp at 572, 575.
" Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir 1991).
62 509 US at 587-88. Rule 702 provides, in relevant part:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FRE 702.
509 US at 597.
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However, the Daubert Court offered the District Court fur..
ther guidance. It ventured several "observations" to consider in
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence that later
courts have adopted as required.' Firsti a court must determine
"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and [ I whether that reasoning or methodol-
ogy properly can be applied to the facts in issue."- In evaluating
the scientific validity of the evidence, courts should consider: (1)
whether the methodology can be proven wrong;" (2) whether
the method has undergone publication and peer review; 7 (3) the
method's known or potential rate of error;" and even (4) wheth-
er the method enjoys general acceptance. 9 Subsequent Circuit
Court of Appeals decisions have added other factors for district
courts to consider.7 ° Second, a judge must determine whether
the proffered evidence "properly can be applied to the facts at
issue," a characteristic courts call "fit."7 1 When evaluating regu-
lation, courts have considered reliability more important than fit,
in part because they view the determination of fit as a question
of policy rather than science.72
6 See notes 66-72 and accompanying text, infra.
509 US at 592-93.
Id at 593. The Court referred to this characteristic as "falsifiability."
67 Id. Later courts have stressed that publication of the particular method is not a
necessary prerequisite for admissibility. See Chikovsky v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 832
F Supp 341, 345 n 5 (S D Fla 1993) (citing Daubert).
509 US at 594.
69 Id. This consideration is the same as the Frye general acceptance test, but now
numbers only one of many factors a court should consider.
70 The Third Circuit enumerated several other criteria, including .... (4) the exis-
tence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; ... (6) the rela-
tionship of the technique to methods which have been established to be reliable; (7) the
qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology; (8) the non-ju-
dicial uses to which the method has been put." In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.,
35 F3d 717, 742 n 8 (3d Cir 1994). See also Wade-Greavy v Whitehall Laboratories, Inc.,
874 F Supp 1441, 1478 (D VI 1994) (considering "the qualifications and professional
stature of the expert witnesses employing the methodology"). The Seventh Circuit has
stressed language in Daubert suggesting that testimony based on a scientific method,
must "rule out 'subjective belief or unsupported speculation.' Porter v Whitehall Laborato-
ries, Inc., 9 F3d 607, 613 (7th Cir 1993) (citing Daubert). See also O'Connor v Common -
wealth Edison Co., 13 F3d 1090, 1106-07 (7th Cir 1994) (rejecting witness's unsupported
contention that he could identify radiation-induced cataracts from mere observation).
Other factors courts have considered include logical consistency, consistency with accepted
theories, and degree of precision. See In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated 11, 911 IF
Supp 775 (M D Pa 1996). Commentators have urged using such other considerations as
the existence of a specialized literature and the extent to which a technique relies on the
expert's subjective interpretation. See Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility,
and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 Minn L Rev 1387, 1396 n 43 (1994).
71 509 US at 592.
72 See, for example, Paoli Railroad Yard, 35 F3d at 746; Cavallo v Star Enterprise,
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Courts remain reluctant to decide scientific facts for agen-
cies. The closest any court has come to reviewing an agency's
scientific determination was in Buchholz v Dayton International
Airport,73 which involved a citizen suit to enjoin the airport's use
of certain de-icing chemicals and force it to pay for the costs of
safe drinking water in the interim.74 The defendant airport used
EPA drinking water standards to argue it had not impermissibly
polluted drinking water with ethylene glycol.7" The plaintiffs'
toxicologist challenged the validity of the standards, but the
District Court allowed the evidence based on his own admission
that the document establishing the standards was both "scientif-
ically sound and peer reviewed."7"
This reluctance by plaintiffs and courts to apply the Daubert
standards to agency decisions based on scientific data is puzzling.
There is certainly no compelling reason not to use the Daubert
standards to review the science behind agency risk assessments,
and both precedent and common sense dictate their application.
B. Applying Daubert: Agency Records as Expert Testimony
under Federal Rule of Evidence 703
When examining agency decisions under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA")," courts shall "hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be...
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law .... "" Under the APA, courts may examine
any agency decision either in a special statutory review proceed-
ing or, if such a proceeding does not exist, in an applicable ac-
tion, including declaratory judgments and injunctions.7 9 Private
parties have challenged EPA actions mainly through this second
option.
However, such challenges take place at the appellate level
rather than in a trial court, forcing the question: do the Federal
Rules of Evidence govern such review? Ordinarily, because ad-
892 F Supp 756, 762 (E D Va 1995).
73 1995 WL 811897 (S D Ohio).
71 Id at *6.
Id at *27.
?' Id. Because the plaintiffs expert essentially conceded the document's admissibility,
the court did not have to decide whether the Daubert standards would apply to an agency
determination of risk.
7 5 USC § 701 et seq (1994).
'8 5 USC § 706(2XA).
79 5 USC § 703.
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ministrative adjudications are not jury trials, courts do not con-
sider agencies bound by the FRE.80 However, as Kenneth Davis
and Richard Pierce, Jr. point out in their Administrative Law
Treatise, "to the extent that the FRE announce any policy rele-
vant to the rules of evidence [governing administrative law], that
policy is contained in Rule 703."81 Focusing a judicial inquiry in
this manner implies that the courts should treat an agency as an
expert in its field. Experts receive great deference from courts, as
expressed in both Rules 702 and 703, but that deference has
limits. Daubert helps describe those limits.
Why treat agencies like testifying experts? Mainly because
the analogy is extremely apt. When agencies justify their regula-
tion of risk to courts, they must offer evidence from the record to
justify their regulatory decisions. The evidence they offer in sup-
port of those regulations will contain, at least in part, the
agency's assessment of the risk regulated. Agencies must use risk
assessments to lay a foundation for the ultimate decision they
make. In that sense a risk assessment operates as expert testi-
mony, designed to help the factfinder make the appropriate de-
terminations of fact. It operates, in the words of FRE 702, to
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine
the fact in issue." 2 Because "the party presenting the expert
must show that the expert's findings are based on sound sci-
ence," 3 the agency must provide evidence from the record justi-
fying its decision.
However, the fact that FRE 702 and 703 may apply to agen-
cy risk determinations does not mean they should always apply.
The court must still decide whether risk assessments represent
factual or policy judgments. If they are factual, then the court
must determine their admissibility. If they are policy, then the
court must defer to the agency's judgment. In Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Su-
preme Court drew a distinction between a "scientific determina-
tion" and "simple findings of fact."" But in Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co., the Court was dealing with predictions where little
' Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 2 Administrative Law Treatise
§§ 10.1-10.3 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1994).
Id § 10.2 at 120.
82 FRE 702.
" Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir 1995)
("Daubert I1').
'" 462 US 87, 103 (1983).
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scientific evidence existed-at the "frontiers of science." " Once
the question retreats from the frontier, scientific determinations
become simple findings of fact, and may be treated accordingly.
In the landmark case Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v
American Petroleum Institute ("The Benzene Case"), the Supreme
Court overruled the Occupational Safety and Health Agency's
("OSHA") risk assessment for benzene exposure in part because
it was based not on any scientific process, but on a "series of
assumptions" indicating a risk of leukemia incidence at 10 parts
per million."
Post-Benzene cases have followed this principle of according
deference to agency decisions, so long as the evidence can with-
stand "hard look" scrutiny. In National Coalition Against the
Misuse of Pesticides v Thomas, the D.C. Circuit reversed the
EPA's determination of proper pesticide exposure levels because
the EPA's decision to modify the levels from 0 parts per billion
(ppb) to 30 ppb (1) rested on statutorily impermissible factors,87
and (2) lacked adequate support in the record." The D.C. Cir-
cuit did not hold that the EPA could not find facts justifying its
decision, merely that the assertions offered in its briefs could not
suffice. 9
Later, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v EPA, the
D.C. Circuit ruled that while an agency's interpretation of equiv-
ocal facts commands deference, that interpretation must rest on
both reasonable inferences and reliable evidence. ° While in this
particular case, the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's Revisions to
National Ambient Air Quality Standards,9 the specific review
the court engaged in involved surveying multiple studies of the ef-
fects of air pollution over a sixteen year period.92
Even courts that have deferred to an agency's finding of facts
without examining the record have done so in situations where
no scientific evidence existed compelling a decision to regulate or
not. In Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v EPA, the
Second Circuit reviewed the EPA's approval of more permissive
Id.
SO 448 US 607, 634 (1980).
87 809 F2d 875, 882 (DC Cir 1987). The EPA had considered the economic impact of
its decision on foreign countries.
" Id.
89 Id.
90 902 F2d 962, 968-69 (DC Cir 1990).
' Id at 976.
9 Id at 968-73.
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sulfur emissions standards in fuels burned by state agencies."!
In noting that no model existed to allow the EPA to predict the
effect of sulfur emissions on other states, the court pointed out
that "it would be unwise to order the Agency to consider effects it,
cannot accurately measure... or to hold that its failure to do so
was an abuse of discretion."' Similarly, in Reynolds Metal Co. v
EPA, the Fourth Circuit upheld EPA effluent limitations because
it considered the scientific determinations the agency made be-
yond the court's competence.95 Specifically, the court called tech-
nological and scientific issues "by their very nature difficult to re-
solve by traditional principles of judicial decisionmaking."' In a.
pre-Daubert world, this assertion was almost certainly true. After
Daubert, intelligible principles exist for determining admissibili-
ty, and courts consider themselves qualified to employ those
principles.97
Courts may competently use the Daubert factors primarily
because they already must use them to examine the admissibility
of evidence into the record for the purposes of determining
whether the EPA's conclusion rests on "substantial evidence.""
Thus, the judge would not second-guess the agency's conclusion,
but simply ensure that the conclusion rests on evidence in the
696 F2d 169, 172 (2d Cir 1982).
Id at 177 (citations omitted).
760 F2d 549, 559 (4th Cir 1985).
Id at 558-59.
See In Re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 922 F Supp 1038, 1050 (M D Pa
1996) (dismissing risk assessment expert's testimony as based on unreliable data). In
dismissing Dr. Zakrzewski's testimony for this portion of the TMI litigation, the district,
court relied on risk assessment guidelines propagated by "several internationally respect-
ed organizations," including the National Academy of Sciences. Id. The court dismissed
the risk assessment because it could not find "even an elementary resemblance between
Dr. Zakrzewski's methodology and any of the internationally recognized methodologies."
Id.
" 5 USC § 706(2XE) (1994). See also National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesti-
cides v EPA, 867 F2d 636, 642 (DC Cir 1989) ("[T]he Administrator satisfies his burden of
production by proffering 'substantial evidence' of harm from respected scientific sources.");
Reynolds Metal Co. v EPA, 760 F2d 549, 558 (4th Cir 1985). This application of Daubert to
agency evidence significantly differs from that proposed by Patricia Smith King in Apply-
ing Daubert to the 'Hard Look" Requirement of NEPA- Scientific Evidence Before the
Forest Service in Sierra Club v Marita, 2 Wis Envir L J 147 (1995). King argues that the
courts should use the Daubert standards to comparatively evaluate the evidence that ex-
isted before the agency at the "hard look" stage. 2 Wis Envir L J at 156-57. King's ag-
gressive approach would allow the court to substitute its own judgment for the agency's
by finding one party's evidence "better" than the other's via application of the Daubert
factors. Applying Daubert for its original gatekeeping purpose, on the other hand, does not
second guess the EPA-it merely ensures that the inquiry into whether a decision was
"arbitrary and capricious" consistently rests on the same balance between deference and
skepticism.
586 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
record that meets the same threshold standards as the other
scientific evidence before the court. In fact, if the court did not
examine agency evidence under the Daubert factors, it would
force plaintiffs challenging an agency decision to meet evidentia-
ry standards that the agency itself could ignore. Provided the
EPA's evidence meets the initial threshold of acceptability under
Daubert, its final determination would then receive the deference
required under the APA. Applying the Daubert gatekeeping func-
tion therefore allows courts to check the validity of the agency's
reasoning while maintaining the proper amount of deference to
the agency's rulemaking and adjudicative powers.
For example, in Reynolds Metal, the Fourth Circuit conclud-
ed that the EPA's scientific judgments deserved deference be-
cause the court could not second-guess the science the EPA
used.99 However, reviewing the court's examination of the record
reveals two points at which applying Daubert would have afford-
ed the searching factual inquiry such decisions require. First, the
plaintiffs asserted that the EPA had miscalculated the effluent
concentrations of TTO, a toxic grease remover, in setting the
acceptable levels of TTO.'° The court blandly deferred to the
EPA's assertion that the error was immaterial. 1 Under
Daubert, if the allegation were true, the court would have reason
to question the EPA's risk assessment because of an elevated
rate of error. 2 While this problem would most likely not prove
fatal to the EPA's assessment, it certainly deserves the court's
attention. Second, the plaintiffs disputed the EPA's method of
collecting data in determining the threat TTO posed.0 3 The
Fourth Circuit immediately deferred to the EPA because it had
conceded that its sampling was not designed for scientific accura-
cy.'"4 Assuming for a moment that the plaintiffs could demon-
strate what proper sampling methods would be, the court would
have to reject the EPA's assessment for three reasons: (1) it con-
tained a large potential source of error,0 5 (2) the method of da-
760 F2d at 559.
'0 Id at 559-60.
101 Id.
Daubert, 509 US at 594.
103 Reynolds Metal, 760 F2d at 561.
104 Id.
105 Daubert, 509 US at 594.
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ta selection was not falsifiable,' ° (3) the method of data selec-
tion had not undergone peer review."7
In cases where courts might rubber-stamp an agency risk
assessment because the litigation has devolved into a swearing
contest between the agency and the plaintiff, the Daubert factors
allow for a more rational method of ensuring decisions are not
arbitrary or capricious than immediate deference to the agency
on questions of fact.
C. The Efficacy of Daubert: Judicial Review as Agency Check
Allowing for a Daubert check forces agencies to make regula-
tory decisions transparently. If agencies know that courts will
examine their methods, then they have an incentive to correct
the false assumptions or overly cautious estimates from which
they start. In addition, applying the Daubert standard requires
agencies to explicitly indicate whether they have relied on science
or policy to justify a decision. Agency policy requires deference.
Agency science can and should be checked.
For example, the Daubert standard requires courts to exam-
ine the known or potential rate of error for a given piece of ex-
pert testimony.' 8 That examination does not necessarily re-
quire the courts to be experts in error rates or statistics them-
selves, but it does require them to know whether they under-
stand what a litigant has provided them."° If an intelligent
layperson can understand the evidence, then the judge may rule
on admissibility. Use of unintelligible technical jargon should not
shield an agency from judicial scrutiny.
The most compelling objection to this scheme argues that it,
requires judges to be scientists. Judge Kozinski expressed this
criticism eloquently during the Ninth Circuit's consideration of
Daubert on remand, complaining that "though we are largely un-
trained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses
whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to
determine whether those experts' proposed testimony amounts to,
'06 Id at 593.
107 Id.
108 509 US at 594.
"00 See, for example, In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 922 F Supp 997,.
1016-19 (M D Pa 1996) (criticizing plaintiffs for obscuring statistical significance of
proffered expert's cancer reanalysis).
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'scientific knowledge,' constitutes 'good science,' and was 'derived
by scientific method.""'
Judge Kozinski is not a lone voice in the wilderness. Com-
mentators have voiced concern about judges' scientific aptitude
since the Court first decided Daubert."' If one worries about
judges' not knowing enough about science to begin with, the
argument runs, why allow them to overrule a specialist's scientif-
ic judgment? One can imagine this argument carries even greater
force when a judge reviews an agency's determination of risk. In
that case, not only does the judge lack expertise, but a standard
of deference to agency determinations already exists. A related
concern argues that judges will (or do) apply more restrictive
standards to scientific determinations under Daubert because
they find it easier to exclude confusing or new evidence than to
actually sift through it to determine its validity.'
These critics fail to realize that the judge does not substitute
her judgment for the agency's but merely acts in a "gatekeeper"
capacity-forcing the agency to live up to the same standards as
any other litigant where scientific evidence is in dispute. The
judge inquires into the admissibility of the agency's scientific
evidence, but not its sufficiency. Those two inquiries pose very
different questions, and the admissibility question proves far
easier to answer. As the Second Circuit stated in Mairana v
United States Mineral Products Co., "Admissibility entails a
threshold inquiry over whether a certain piece of evidence ought
to be admitted at trial.... A sufficiency inquiry.., asks
whether the collective weight of a litigant's evidence is adequate
to present a jury question ....
In addition, judges are not without guidance in assessing
admissibility. Daubert itself provides several non-technical guide-
lines for the initial assessment of the validity of scientific evi-
dence. Judges also have recourse to references like the Federal
Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence."" In
sum, judges would not have to become scientific experts to rule
on the admissibility of scientific evidence-they would merely
have to be judges.
,,o Daubert 11, 43 F3d at 1316.
. See, for example, Wayne Roth-Nelson and Kathey Verdeal, Risk Evidence in Toxic
Torts, 2 Envir Lawyer 405, 435-37 (1996) (arguing most judges lack scientific expertise to
review the relevance and reliability of scientific evidence).
1 Sanders, 78 Minn L Rev at 1429 (cited in note 70).
13 52 F3d 1124, 1132 (2d Cir 1995) (emphasis in original).
1 Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (FJC 1994).
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Others object that the quality of data required for regulation
differs from that .required for litigation.115 Specifically, data
used for preventive regulation need not and should not meet the
same rigorous standards as data used in establishing causation
in a toxic tort suit. 6 However, as already argued, application
of the Daubert standard imposes a threshold test for admissibili-
ty, not a test of the comparative weight of evidence. It is difficult
to imagine a situation in which an agency could offer no data to
support its decision to regulate risks that could meet the minimal
Daubert threshold. In fact, one might argue that courts should
consider a decision based on no or incompetent data "arbitrary
and capricious" on its face.
Leaving aside the objections to the court's ability to find
scientific fact, still other reasons exist to give a Daubert-style
review function to the courts. Courts may be the most effective
means of checking agency mistake or self-interest. The legisla-
ture will likely respond to interest-group pressure and treat stat-
utes giv ing agencies guidance as yet another method of providing
pork to their constituents."7 The executive branch, while politi-
cally accountable to a national constituency rather than a series
of local ones, suffers from self-interest as well. If executive agen-
cies formulate the standards, the executive branch will likely
seek to uphold them even if they prove inferior or based on sub-
standard science.
Finally, while applying Daubert to judicial review of risk
assessments helps to make the regulation of environmental risks
more rational, it does so with a minimum of disruption to the
current administrative regime. The largest problem with many
calls for risk reform is that they require revolutionary changes to
effect their desired result."' Applying Daubert imposes no
"" Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Assessment and the Interface Between Science and Law,
14 Colum J Envir L 343, 351 (1989).
"' Id. Contrast Patricia Smith King's argument that regulatory agencies should use
the exact same evidence as that proffered in federal court. 2 Wis Envir L J at 156 (cited
in note 98).
"' Basically, Congress will likely provide "guidance" to agencies that proves beneficial
to constituents from individual districts by, for example, interpreting a statute to provide
an exemption for a federally funded project or constituent industry. See Robert Glickman
and Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54
L & Contemp Probs 249, 286 (1991) ("It would appear that the senators saw little distinc-
tion between the Clean Air Act and a fight over which defense installations to close, or an
appropriation for public works projects. The pork tastes as good, from whichever barrel it
comes.").
'18 See, for example, John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself. The
Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U Cin L Rev 1643, 1672-74
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grand new vision on the present regulatory regime-it neither
dramatically enlarges nor drastically restricts the role of govern-
ment in regulating risk. What it does do is make regulation more
effective by eliminating the most likely, and most preventable,
sources of potential error.
CONCLUSION
The EPA faces a number of challenges in its attempts to
regulate environmental problems. While the difficulties posed by
absurd regulatory results, inconsistent valuation of risks, and
scientific inaccuracy in risk assessment are deeply ingrained in
the regulatory system, it is possible to alleviate these problems in
part by enhancing the effectiveness of judicial review of agency
decisions. This Comment has argued that applying the Daubert
standard of admissibility for scientific evidence in cases challeng-
ing agency regulatory decisions best preserves the balance be-
tween the deference to agency policy commanded by the Supreme
Court and the judicial skepticism necessary to ensure that courts
are not mere rubber stamps for environmental policy. Applying
Daubert gives the courts both the power and the guidance to
examine the validity of the facts undergirding regulation of envi-
ronmental risk, without sacrificing the ability of the EPA to inde-
pendently make that policy.
Regulation of environmental risk remains a priority for the
United States. Applying the Daubert standards of scientific valid-
ity to the review of that process ensures that environmental
regulation rests on rational, falsifiable, correctable bases. By
keeping the regulatory process scientific, Daubert helps to keep it
effective.
(1995) (arguing for overhaul of environmental legislation as a whole); Mark Eliot Shere,
The Myth of Meaningful Risk Assessment, 19 Harv Envir L Rev 409, 480-91 (1995) (argu-
ing regulators should focus on environmental ethics and "quality of life" rather than
quantifiable public health risks); Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward
Effective Risk Regulation 55-81 (Harvard 1993) (proposing centralized bureaucratic
oversight group); Donald T. Horstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative
Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 Colum L Rev 562, 629-33 (1992) (arguing that
regulators should consider questions of equity among risk bearers and obligations to other
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